F. got more worked up minute by minute, sensing the failure of the offensive, had harsh words for supply service, deficiency of initiative on the part of the higher field commanders, placed all blame on OKH, Chief of the General Staff and Jodl.
It was definite policy, moreover, for the anti-tank guns to open at short range, and not to dispel a tank attack by using medium or field artillery at long range. The 5th Field Regiment, for instance, withheld fire until enemy tanks had run up against the forward six-pounders, and then fired on the infantry and the soft-skinned vehicles following the tanks, with the result that the tanks were isolated and received no support from the ground troops.
The subject of morale had been dropped, and I was now required to proceed with the general “ disorganisation” of German industry, giving priority to certain aspects of it such as U-boat building, aircraft production, oil production, transportation and so forth, which gave me a very wide range of choice and allowed me to attack pretty well any German industrial city of 100,000 inhabitants and above.
Both tactically and strategically, this was an outstanding operation. Besides the ships sunk, from 59 to 83 planes had been shot down and at least 9 others damaged. The Army Air Forces lost 1 B-17 and 3 P-38′s in combat, and a B-25 and a Beaufighter through other causes. Total Army Air Forces personnel losses came to 13 while the Japanese lost approximately 12,700 officers and men.
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